Fact-based, Non-Expert Testimony from Residents or Other Concerned Citizens is competent, substantial evidence on the issues of aesthetics and community character. 

Fact-based testimony of lay witnesses (as opposed to general statements of concern or opposition) may constitute competent, substantial evidence: 

Under the correct legal standard, citizen testimony in a zoning matter is perfectly permissible and constitutes substantial competent evidence, so long as it is fact-based. Id.; see also Grefkowicz v. Metropolitan Dade County, 389 So. 2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Mere generalized statements of opposition are to be disregarded, but fact-based testimony is not. A quasi-judicial decision cannot be based on generalized statements of opposition, or concern. However, lay witnesses can provide factual testimony that would support a decision. Grefkowicz v. Dade County, 389 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).  

Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d 598, 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (J. Cope dissenting, adopted as the opinion of the court on rehearing en banc Feb. 21, 1996). 

"Fact based testimony" of lay witnesses includes their testimony regarding aesthetics and community character and the compatibility of a proposed project with existing development. In Metropolitan Dade County v. Section 11 Property Corp., 719 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), the Third DCA reviewed a case in which the county commission denied a special exception for mini self-storage facility. Planning staff had supported the special exception as compatible with surrounding areas, but neighborhood residents testified at the hearing that the facility would increase traffic noise and decrease property values, and would not be aesthetically compatible. The County Commission denied the special exception based on incompatibility. On certiorari review, the circuit court held that the County Commission's finding of incompatibility was not supported by competent evidence, as the neighbors' testimony was merely opinion. The third DCA quashed the circuit court's writ on the grounds that because the commission could properly consider aesthetics, the residents* testimony was fact-based, and the testimony coupled with the documentary evidence supported the denial. The Third DCA stated: 

The Commission received the testimony of several neighbors who characterized the project as "industrial" and who stated that the project would be incompatible with the surrounding residential neighborhood. Specifically, one neighbor stated that the self-storage facility would be "an eyesore." He commented that any proposed landscaping to try to enhance the appearance of the self-storage facility would not be effective and stated, "it's almost like trying to put an elephant in a Volkswagen, you still know the elephant is there." This fact-based testimony regarding the aesthetic incompatibility of the project with the surrounding neighborhood, coupled with the site plan, elevation drawings, and the aerial photograph constituted substantial competent evidence supporting the denial of the exception. Metropolitan Dade County v. Sportacres Dev. Group, Inc., 698 So. 2d 281, 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d 598, 607 (Fla. 3d DCA), review dismissed, 680 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1996). Where, as here, the County Commission's denial of the special exception was supported by substantial competent evidence, we find that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law. 

719 So. 2d at 1205. See, also, Board of County Commn'rs of Pinellas County v. City of Clearwater, 440 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (lay testimony of witnesses with first-hand knowledge of the vicinity can constitute "expert testimony" on effect of project on natural beauty and recreational advantages).

Consistency with the comprehensive plan must be determined by reference to the criteria in the comprehensive plan, and not by reference to ordinances that implement the plan  

Based on earlier testimony in this case before the Bay County Commission, Interveners

anticipate that the Petitioner will argue that compliance with some elements of the Bay County Comprehensive Plan is deferred to the County*s Land Development Regulations. This is error. In Buck Lake Alliance, Inc. v. Leon County, the First District Court of Appeal considered such an argument. The Court referred to Section 163.3194(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and held that "the clear meaning of this provision is that compliance of a development order with the comprehensive plan is to be determined by reference to "the objectives, policies, land uses, and densities or intensities in the comprehensive plan" itself; and not by reference to ordinances purportedly adopted to implement the plan." (765 So. 2d at 126)(emphasis in original). See, also, Franklin County v. S.G.I. Limited, 728 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1^st DCA 1999).  
 

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